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Against Mathematical Convenientism 
 
Abstract 
Indispensablists argue that when our belief system conflicts with our experiences, we can 
negate a mathematical belief but we do not because if we do, we would have to make an 
excessive revision of our belief system. Thus, we retain a mathematical belief not because we 
have good evidence for it but because it is convenient to do so. I call this view ‘mathematical 
convenientism.’ I argue that mathematical convenientism commits the consequential fallacy 
and that it demolishes the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument and Baker’s enhanced 
indispensability argument.  
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1. Introduction 
No pure mathematical sentence like 1+1=2 was refuted in the history of science. Charles 
Parsons (1983) argues that the historical fact undermines the Quine-Putnam indispensability 
argument according to which observations confirm mathematical beliefs as well as concrete 
beliefs, beliefs that are about concrete objects like trees and electrons. Indispensablists reply 
that we can negate a mathematical belief but we do not because negating a mathematical 
belief has the unpalatable consequence of having to make an excessive revision of our belief 
system. Thus, we retain a mathematical belief not because we have good evidence for it but 
because it is convenient to do so. I call this view ‘mathematical convenientism.’  
This paper aims to show that it is incoherent for indispensablists to rely on 
mathematical convenientism to meet Parsons’s objection. I proceed as follows. In Section 2, I 
explicate the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, the target of Parsons’s criticism. I 
expose two important ideas that are inherent in the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. 
They are mathematical realism and mathematical confirmationism. Mathematical realism is 
the view that mathematical objects are real, and mathematical confirmationism is the view 
that observations can confirm a mathematical belief. In Section 3, I argue that mathematical 
convenientism commits the consequential fallacy and that it demolishes both mathematical 
realism and confirmationism. In the end, it will become clear that indispensablists cannot 
avail themselves of mathematical convenientism. 
 
2. The Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument 
Mathematical realism holds that mathematical objects, such as numbers, triangles, and 
functions, are real. Where do they exist? Mathematical realism asserts that they exist not in 
the concrete world but in the abstract world. The concrete world is the world in which there 
are concrete objects, such as human beings, stones, and electrons. They are spatial, temporal, 
and causal objects. They can causally interact with one another. In contrast, the abstract 
world is the world in which there are abstract objects, such as mathematical objects and 
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propositions. They are aspatial, atemporal, and non-causal objects. There is no space and no 
flow of time in the abstract world. Hence, abstract objects can causally interact neither with 
one another nor with concrete objects. 
Why should we believe that mathematical objects exist in the abstract world? A famous 
argument advanced in support of mathematical realism is the Quine-Putnam indispensability 
argument. It is defended by Willard V. O. Quine (1948, 1980, 1992), Hilary Putnam (1971), 
Michael Resnik (1997), and Mark Colyvan (2001). It says roughly that mathematics is 
indispensable to our best scientific theories, observations confirm mathematical components 
as well as concrete components of our best scientific theories, and hence we ought to believe 
that mathematical entities are real, just as we ought to believe that theoretical entities, such as 
electrons and black holes, are real. On the indispensablist account, we ought to believe that 
all and only objects postulated by our best scientific theories. Thus, we ought not to believe, 
for example, that witches are real because no scientific theory posits their existence. But we 
ought to believe that mathematical and theoretical entities are real because our best scientific 
theories posit their existence. Quine (1980: 45), Putnam (1979: 347), and Colyvan (2006: 
226-227) claim that it is intellectually dishonest to believe that theoretical entities are real but 
that mathematical entities are not. Keep in mind that as far as these eminent philosophers of 
mathematics are concerned, mathematical entities are epistemically on a par with theoretical 
entities. 
The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument contains two ideas that are important for 
the purpose of this paper. The first idea is the view that mathematical objects are real, and the 
second idea is the view that observations confer justification on a mathematical sentence. A 
mathematical hypothesis can be confirmed by empirical data, just as a concrete hypothesis 
can be confirmed by empirical data. I earlier named this philosophical view on confirmation 
‘mathematical confirmationism.’ Indispensablists use mathematical confirmationism as a 
means to arrive at mathematical realism. In other words, mathematical confirmationism is 
indispensablists’ answer to the epistemological question: How do you know that 
mathematical objects exist?  
Both mathematical realism and mathematical confirmationism presuppose that a 
mathematical statement is not analytic but synthetic. An analytic statement is true or false 
solely in virtue of the meaning of the statement, whereas a synthetic statement is true or false 
in virtue of the meaning of the statement and in virtue of the way the world is. An analytic 
statement does not contain information about the world, whereas a synthetic statement does. 
So if a mathematical statement is analytic, mathematical realism collapses. The mathematical 
statement, ‘1+1=2,’ if analytically true, does not entail that numbers are real. Also, an 
analytic statement is not the kind of statement that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by 
observations, whereas a synthetic statement is the kind of statement that can be confirmed or 
disconfirmed by observations. So if a mathematical statement is analytic, the justification for 
it does not come from observations, i.e., mathematical confirmationism is false. Keep in mind 
that an analytic statement is not subject to an empirical refutation, whereas a synthetic 
statement is subject to an empirical refutation. 
 
3. Mathematical Convenientism 
Many objections have been raised against the Quine-Putnam indispensability in the literature. 
This paper concerns only Parsons’s objection (1983) that if a mathematical sentence can be 
confirmed by observations, it should also be able to be disconfirmed by observations. But “no 
proposition of pure mathematics has been falsified” (Parsons, 1983: 196). Why is it, for 
example, that ‘1+1=2’ was not refuted in the history of science? The history of science 
constitutes the prima facie reason for thinking that a mathematical sentence is not the kind of 
3 
 
sentence that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical data. It appears that a 
mathematical sentence is not synthetic but analytic, contrary to what the Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument presupposes. 
In my view, indispensablists should take Parsons’s objection seriously because they 
contend, as we noted before, that it is intellectually dishonest to believe that theoretical 
entities are real, but mathematical entities are not. A similar attack can be directed at 
indispensablists, viz., a double standard is involved in the suggestion that a concrete 
hypothesis is subject to an empirical refutation, but a mathematical hypothesis is not. Under 
the indispensablist framework, it is intellectually dishonest to believe that a concrete 
hypothesis can, but a mathematical hypothesis cannot, be disconfirmed by observations. 
Moreover, Parsons’s observation of the history of science can be strengthened. There is 
a gross historical asymmetry between theoretical and mathematical entities. Many theoretical 
entities like the celestial sphere, ether, phlogiston, and caloric fluids turned out to be 
nonexistent, as Larry Laudan’s list (1981: 33) of past theories indicates. Laudan’s list is often 
cited in the philosophy of science literature as supporting the pessimistic induction that since 
past theories turned out to be false, present theories will also turn out be false. Laudan’s list, 
however, does not show that mathematical objects like numbers, triangles, and functions 
turned out to be nonexistent. Thus, the history of science indicates that a mathematical 
statement is not the kind of statement which can be confirmed or disconfirmed by 
observations.  
How do indispensablists respond to Parsons’s objection in the literature? Quine replies 
that we can, but we do not, negate a mathematical sentence, “for mathematics infiltrates all 
branches of our system of the world, and its disruption would reverberate intolerably” (Quine, 
1992: 15). In other words, negating a concrete belief requires a small revision of our belief 
system, but negating a mathematical belief requires an exorbitant revision of our belief 
system. Hence, we ought to displace a concrete belief with a new one rather than a 
mathematical belief with a new one. Colyvan concurs with Quine, saying that “it’s not that 
mathematical theories are unfalsifiable in any absolute sense; it’s just that whenever they are 
part of a falsified package, the mathematical portion is unusually salvaged for reasons of 
minimum mutilation to the web of belief” (2001: 126). Resnik agrees with Quine and 
Colyvan, saying that modifying a mathematical theory “is likely to send reverberations into 
currently quiescent areas of science” (Resnik, 1997: 125-126). Notice that according to these 
philosophers, the reason for safeguarding a mathematical belief is not epistemic but 
pragmatic. To put it another way, we adhere to a mathematical belief not because we have 
sufficient evidence revealing it to be true but because we want to avoid the inconvenience of 
revising inordinately many concrete beliefs. 
An interesting consequence follows from the preceding indispensablist account of why 
we do not discard a mathematical belief. Indispensablists are mathematical realists believing 
that mathematical objects are real. They now claim, however, that we retain a mathematical 
belief not because we have the good evidence for it but because it is convenient to do so. I 
earlier named this view ‘mathematical convenientism.’ Mathematical convenientism is 
motivated by a pragmatic consideration as opposed to an epistemic consideration. Therefore, 
mathematical convenientism commits the consequential fallacy. 
The consequential fallacy occurs when we conflate the effect of holding a belief to be 
true with the evidence for it. Specifically, we hold a belief to be true not because we have 
good evidence for it but because it is useful. To use Merrilee Salmon’s example (2007: 210), 
some smokers believe that heavy smoking is not harmful to our health on the grounds that 
they are happier if they believe so. To use a famous example from philosophy of religion, 
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) argued that we ought to believe in God not because we have the 
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sufficient evidence for his existence but because the belief in him might be tremendously 
beneficial to us after we die. Pascal provided the pragmatic justification as opposed to the 
epistemic justification for the belief that God exists. Both the smokers and Pascal committed 
the consequential fallacy. 
Analogously, indispensablists commit the consequential fallacy when they attempt to 
justify their choice of one belief system over another by appealing to the pragmatic 
consideration that discarding a mathematical belief involves an excessive change in our 
preexisting belief system. There are two rival belief systems, S1 and S2. S1 is the result of 
discarding a concrete belief in our current belief system. S2 is the result of discarding a 
mathematical belief in our current belief system. Both S1 and S2 can cope with our 
experiences. Indispensablists claim that we should choose S1 over S2 because it is convenient 
to do so. Thus, we safeguard a mathematical belief not because we have good evidence for it 
but because if we do so, we do not have to go through the pain of revising numerous concrete 
beliefs. Indispensablists have confounded the effect of retaining a mathematical belief with 
the evidence for it.  
Let me elucidate three disastrous consequences of mathematical convenientism on 
indispensablists. First, mathematical convenientism wreaks havoc on mathematical beliefs. If 
indispensablists choose S1 over S2 on the grounds that it is convenient to do so, their 
mathematical beliefs are not epistemically justified but practically justified. They believe, for 
example, that 1+1=2 not because they have good evidence for it but because they are happier 
if they do so. It follows that indispensablists can no longer believe that mathematical objects 
are real. Thus, mathematical realism collapses.  
Second, mathematical convenientism also wreaks havoc on observational beliefs. 
Indispensablists believe, for example, that a cat is on the mat after they have chosen S1 over 
S2. Mathematical convenientism, however, implies that their observational beliefs are not 
epistemically warranted but practically warranted. Indispensablists believe, for example, that 
a cat is on the mat not because they have good evidence for it but because it is convenient to 
do so. It follows that indispensablists can no longer say that observational beliefs support a 
mathematical hypothesis. After all, an epistemically unjustified belief cannot confer 
epistemic justification on another belief. Thus, mathematical confirmationism collapses too. 
Third, mathematical convenientism destroys not only the Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument but also the enhanced indispensability argument recently defended 
by Alan Baker (2005, 2009, 2012). Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument holds that a 
mathematical hypothesis can best explain concrete phenomena, so if we believe that a 
concrete hypothesis is true on the grounds that it best explains concrete phenomena, we 
should also believe that a mathematical hypothesis is true. Baker provides the famous 
example to justify his contention that a mathematical hypothesis can best explain concrete 
phenomena. He does not claim that a mathematical hypothesis is confirmed by observations 
because it is an indispensable part of our scientific theory which is confirmed by observations. 
He rather claims that like a concrete hypothesis, a mathematical hypothesis can be directly 
supported by observations. 
Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument is better than the Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument because it is not committed to the problematic doctrine, 
confirmational holism. Confirmational holism holds that observations confirm not just some 
parts of a scientific theory but all parts of a scientific theory. Confirmational holism has 
received severe criticisms from Penelope Maddy (1992) and Jacob Busch (2012). Maddy 
observes that we do not believe that ideal entities, such as frictionless slope and continuous 
fluids, are real, although they are indispensable parts of our best scientific theories. Busch 
appeals to Philip Kitcher (1993: 140-149) and Stathis Psillos (1999, Chapters 5 and 6) who 
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distinguish between working components and idle components of the ether theory and the 
caloric theory, respectively, and then argue that empirical evidence supported working 
components, but not idle components of the past theories. It is no longer clear these days 
whether there is any indispensablist who sticks to confirmational holism. 
Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument is similar to the Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument in an important respect. They are both committed to mathematical 
realism and confirmationism. So the enhanced indispensability argument is also subject to 
Parsons’s objection, and if Baker appeals to mathematical convenientism to confront 
Parsons’s objection, his enhanced indispensability argument, although better than the Quine-
Putnam indispensability argument, also falls preys to my criticism that mathematical 
convenientism destroys both mathematical realism and confirmationism. 
 
4. Objection and Reply 
A referee brings my attention to the recent attempts (Lakoff and Núñez, 2001; Dehaene, 2011) 
in cognitive science to give an evolutionary account of mathematics. On the evolutionary 
account, our minds are genetically hardwired to think that 1+1=2 because of the environment 
in which our ancestors evolved. Our minds would be genetically hardwired to think that 
1+1=1, if our ancestors had evolved in a different environment: 
 
At our scale, the world is mostly made up of separable objects that combine into sets according 
to the familiar equation 1+1=2. This is why evolution has anchored this rule in our genes. 
Perhaps our arithmetic would have been radically different if, like cherubs, we had evolved in 
the heavens where one cloud plus another cloud was still one cloud. (Dehaene, 2011: 231) 
 
The evolutionary account of mathematics has an interesting implication on my previous 
contention concerning the history of science. In Section 3, I said that the history of science 
gives rise to the suspicion that mathematical sentences like 1+1=2 are analytic, so 
indispensablists have the burden to explain why no pure mathematical sentence was refuted 
in the history of science. This analytic account can be undermined by the evolutionary 
account that no pure mathematical sentence was discarded in the history of science because 
pure mathematical sentences are genetically hardwired in our minds. It was psychologically 
impossible for our scientific predecessors to get the belief 1+1=2 off their minds. 
The referee’s objection is reasonable. The evolutionary account indeed undermines the 
analytic account. It is not clear, however, that the evolutionary account helps indispensablists. 
Mathematical realism collapses, if it is true that we think that 1+1=2 not because we have 
good evidence for it but because we are evolutionarily hardwired to think so. Mathematical 
realists confront a vexing question: Why do we believe that 1+1=2 as opposed to 1+1=1? 
They cannot say that we believe so because our ancestors evolved on the earth as opposed to 
on the heaven and because the belief 1+1=2 was useful on the earth, although the belief 
1+1=1 was useful on the heaven. To say so is to commit the consequential fallacy. Hence, 
indispensablists cannot appeal to the evolutionary account to meet Parsons’s challenge. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Indispensablists appeal to mathematical convenientism to blunt Parsons’s objection that no 
sentence of pure mathematics was refuted in the history of science. Mathematical 
convenientism holds that we can but do not negate a mathematical belief because negating a 
concrete belief requires a minor revision whereas negating a mathematical belief requires a 
sweeping revision of our belief system. I objected that on a close examination, mathematical 
convenientism demolishes both mathematical realism and convenientism. The spirit of the 
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Quine-Putnam indispensability argument and Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument is 
that observations confer epistemic justification on our mathematical beliefs. Indispensablists, 
however, unwittingly have gone against the spirit in the attempt to defend mathematical 
realism from Parsons’s challenge. 
Indispensablists are in a dilemma. A mathematical sentence is either susceptible or 
immune to an empirical refutation. On the one hand, if they say that it is susceptible to an 
empirical refutation, they are free from the charge that they hold a double standard with 
respect to mathematical and concrete sentences, and they can adhere to mathematical 
confirmationism. They, however, have the burden to explain why no sentence of pure 
mathematics was disconfirmed in the history of science, and why theoretical entities like 
ether and phlogiston were thrown out, but mathematical entities like numbers and triangles 
were not. On the other hand, if indispensablists say that a mathematical sentence is immune 
to an empirical refutation, they do not have the burden to explain why 1+1=2 was not refuted 
in the history of science and why there is the gross historical asymmetry between theoretical 
and mathematical entities. This position, however, invites the suspicion that mathematical 
sentences are not synthetic but analytic. The conclusion of this paper is that it is better for 
indispensablists to be in this dilemma than to escape from it with the use of mathematical 
convenientism. 
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